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Introduction
While the FDA has broad authority to enforce the FDCA, some
argue that the FDA is not doing enough.1 Yet many attempts by the FDA
to expand its authority or to try novel, and possibly more eective methods,
have been blocked by the courts.2 Sometimes, this judicial curtailment of FDA
authority has lead to disastrous results. For example, in 1977, on the basis
of new scientic studies, the FDA twice tried to seize an amino acid called L-
tryptophan, which was labelled as a dietary supplement; both times the District
Court involved prevented the seizure.3 As a result of these two court losses oand
the concomitant expenses o the FDA stopped attempting to regulate the mar-
keting of amino acids to consumers.4 L-tryptophan continued to be produced
and sold as a dietary supplement until 1990, when it was shown to cause an ill-
ness called EosinophiliaMyalgia Syndrome (EMS).5 As a result of L-trypophan
remaining on the market, thirty-eight people have died and 1500 people have
been injured. Moreover, two years after the EMS outbreak was caused by L-
1See. e.g. Arthur Kalett & F.J. Schlink, 100.000.000 Guinea Pigs (1933)(Peter Barton Hutt
& Richard A. Merrill, Food & Drug Law: Cases and Materials 2d Ed. (1991). f hereinafter
CB1 at 1148, 1149).
2See. e.g. U.S. v. C.E.B. Products. Inc. 380 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. II. 1974)(CB 1178)(hold-
ing that FDA is without authority to request a judicially-ordered recall); U.S. v. Parkinson
240 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1956)(CB 1175)(holding that FDA is without authority to request
restitution to purchasers of products in violation of the FDCA).
3Carter Anne McGowan, Learning the Hard Way: L-Tryptophan. the FDA. and the Regulation of
4 Id.
5 Id.
1tryptophan, it was revealed that although eighty percent of [thel EMS cases
showed some improvement, over sixty percent of the patients had symptoms
characterized as moderately to extremely severe, and only ten percent had com-
pletely recovered.6
Amino Acids 3 Cornell J.L & Pub. Pol'y 383, (1994). p.2
The rationales used to deny granting broader authority to the FDA
have focused on technicalities:7 the literal language of the FDCAZ whether pri-
vate individuals were named as parties to the action;8 and in the L-tryptophan
cases, a clerical error which resulted in L-tryptophan erroneously appearing as
a nutrient/ dietary supplement rather than as a food additive in 1977's Code
of Federal Regulation.9 What is lacking in these cases is an economic analysis
of the issues. When technicalities govern, and concerns of eciency and social
optimality are ignored, society will inevitably be harmed. This fact is evidenced
by the L-tryptophan tragedy.
In this paper, I hope to introduce the world of Law & Economics to
the world of FDA enforcement. By no means is this an eort to analyze every
problem dealing with the subject of FDA enforcement. Similarly, the purpose
of this paper is not to arrive at solutions for problems, although I will suggest
some. Most of the solutions to the topics I will discuss can only be made on a
case-by-case basis. Rather than attempt that feat, this paper seeks to establish a
rudimentary framework for thinking about the problems of FDA enforcement by
6 Id.
7 See C.E.B. Products CB at 1178.
8See~m~n CB at 1175.
9 McGowan, supra note 3.
2analyzing ve areas. Section A will discuss FDA sanctions and how they impact
on incentives to act in a socially ecient way. The remaining four sections will
take a more in depth look at four of the individual enforcement mechanisms.
Section B will deal with inspection, C with seizure, D with criminal liability
and the Guaranty Clause,10 and E with recall. Once again, this paper is only a
beginning, not an end.
A.Preserving Deterrence oProblems With Incentives
In an ideal world, a manufacturer M would only act in socially
benecial ways. Expressed in a dierent way, if an activity causes more harm to
society than it benets society, we would not want M to engage in that activity.
If we want M not only to take the proper care when acting, but also to engage
in the activity at the socially optimal level, then we should hold M strictly liable
to pay for all the harm that it causes, i.e., pay for the costs it imposes on society
regardless of fault.11 There are two ways we can make M pay for the costs it
imposes on society. The rst is harm-based liability, which means that we will
make M pay each time it causes harm. The second is act-based liability, which
means that every time M acts in a certain way we will make it pay. Under either
10x303(c) of the FDCA.
11Shavell, Principles of Economic Analysis of Law x13.3.5. The dierence between care level
and activity level can be explained by example: let us say that for a driver to take proper
care, she must wear a seatbelt, not consume alcohol, check her rear view mirror periodically,
follow all trac laws, and take a 5 minute rest stop for every 3 hours she drives. Her activity
level, on the other hand, is how much she drives per day; she may drive 1 hour per day or
10 hours. Under a negligence or fault-based system, she would be liable only if she violates
a standard of care. Assuming she does not, she would never pay for any harm done. This
is true no matter how often she drives, even though by driving 10 hours a day instead of 1
hour per day, she increases the probability that she will be involved in an accident, merely
by being on the road so many hours (and by increasing congestion). Under a negligence, or
fault-based system, assuming M, the manufacturer, took the optimal level of care, it would
engage in [its] activity to too great an extent because, unlike under strict liability, [M does]
not pay for the accident losses titi cause[s]. Id.
3system, the goal is to force M to pay for the costs its acts impose on society.
As a result, M will act only if the benet it expects to gain outweighs the costs
it expects to impose. Therefore, under a harm-based liability system, M should
pay for any harm that it ever causes. Under an act-based liability system, M
should pay for the expected harm due to the act, regardless of whether any
harm actually occurs.12 In either regime, the rm's expected p. liability is
the expected harm.13 In either system, therefore, will act only if [its] expected
benet exceeds the expected harm, that is [MI will act if and only if that is
socially desirable. Hence, the optimal outcome will result.14
Our current FDCA enforcement system is a combination of act-
based and harm-based liability. Private individuals can sue M under our tort law
and try to recover for any harms done to them by M. While some jurisdictions
employ a fault-based liability system for general torts, many jurisdictions treat
harms caused by violations of the FDCA as negligence per se.15 In reality,
such as system is a strict-liability regime for harms caused by violations of
the FDCA. Our enforcement system also has elements of an act-based liability
system. For example, the FDA, through the U.S. Attorney's Oce, can bring
a criminal suit against someone who commits an act which violates the FDCA.
12Shavell, Principles of Economic Analysis of Law x21.2.8. An expected variable is a prob-
ability weighted average. Using two examples is probably the easiest way to explain. If I ip
a coin and someone oers me $100 if it lands head, 50 percent of the time I will win $100,
and 50 percent of the time I will win $0. If I ip a coin twice, on average I will win once
and receive $100. Therefore, if I ip the coin one time, it is said that my expected winnings
is $50. The equation to determine this is 50%~100 + 50%~0 = 50. Expected variables are
as complicated as the number of possible outcomes. If I played a game where there was a 10
percent chance of winning $10, a 30 percent chance of winning $100, a 5 percent chance of
winning $1000, and a 55 percent chance of winning nothing, my expected winnings =
13Shavell, Principles of Economic Analysis of Law x21.2.
14Shavell, Principles of Economic Analysis of Law x21.2.2.
15See. e.g. Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. Eutsler 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960)(CB 1220)
4If a drug is mislabelled, the manufacturer can be punished even if no harm
ever occurs. Other FDA enforcement mechanisms, such as seizure, injunction,
voluntary recall, and publicity can be employed whenever rms are engaging in
acts which violate the FDCA.
As stated previously, for a manufacturer M to act in a socially op-
timal manner, M's expected liability for engaging in an activity should be equal
to the expected harm caused by this activity. We can determine mathematically
what the expected liability is by looking at each possible source of liability and
multiplying it by the probability of each source occurring. Let EL16 be the Ex-
pected Liability that M faces. Let t be the probability that private individuals
wins a tort claim against M. Let T be the cost to M if the private individual
does win a tort claim. Let f be the probability that M receives a criminal ne.
Let F be the amount the ne is, if a criminal ne is
.1.10 +.3.100 +.05.1000 +.55.0 = $81. Expected Harm, therefore
would be found by multiplying the probability that the act will cause harm by
the amount of actual harm caused if harm occurs. p.5 imposed. Let s, i, r, and
p be the probabilities that M faces a seizure, an injunction, recall, or publicity
respectively. Let 5, I, R, and P be the actual cost that M faces if it does face a
seizure, an injunction, recall, or publicity, respectively. Then (EL = tT + fF +
sS + ii +rR + pP.17 If (EH equals the expected harm to society caused by M's
action, then ideally, (EL = (EH = tT + fF + sS + il +rR + pP. and thus, M
will act if and only if acting is socially desirable.18
16Let CE be the symbol for Expected.
17See supra note 12.
18It should be noted that a manufacturer will rarely, if ever, face all six possibilities at once.
5One potential problem with having this dual system of sanctions
(tort and FDA initiated) is the possibility of double punishment. If there is a
type of violation where a tort suit if very likely to be brought, and the plainti
will recover for all of his harms, then the expected sanction under the tort system
alone will adequately preserve incentives. If the FDA also initiates sanctions
against the rm, then the total expected sanction the rm will face may exceed
the expected harm. Firms will be over-deterred in eorts to avoid harm, and
will ineciently take too much care.19 There are, however, many reasons why
the tort system might fail to hold M liable for the expected harm it causes. A
very incomplete list of reasons is: 1) the harm is not likely to be attributed
to the product; 2) the harm is suciently small as to make bringing suit not
worthwhile; 3) any of the many other reasons why people may not bring suit;
4) the rm may be able to settle the dispute for a price less than the harm
caused; and 5) the tort award does not factor in all harms to the individual
such as pain and suering, mental anguish, or other non-pecuniary costs. In
such situations, where the tort system fails to completely reect the expected
harm, a supplemental sanction initiated by the FDA, if properly calculated,
would ensure proper care and activity levels.20
While it is conceivable that over-deterrence could be a problem, in
all likelihood, under-deterrence is a more realistic and more widespread problem.
Either the goods will be seized, or there will be a recall, etc. Many times it will be useful
to think of (EL as equal to the probability that M will face liability multiplied by the actual
liability L it will face if it does face liability.
19It is beyond dispute that for a company to invest $10,000,000 to avoid $100 in harm is
just as wasteful as failing to invest $100 to avoid $10,000,000 in harm. Both courses of action
waste $9,999,900.
20Having two sets of litigation costs, however, would seem to be inecient in that it entails
duplicative administrative costs.
6Our current system is very troublesome in terms of preserving adequate incen-
tives to act optimally. While the maximum nes provided for by statute are very
steep,21 in practice, the nes are often paltry. For example, in U.S. v. Park22 the
CEO of a company was convicted of allowing food to be stored in a warehouse
infested with rodents, and of allowing the food to be exposed to contamina-
tion by rodents. The FDA charged the defendant with ve counts of causing
food adulteration. The CEO was convicted and ned $50 for each count. This
sanction is a travesty. Since adulteration would rarely result in tort liability
(consumers are ignorant of most adulteration, and would rarely bring suit un-
less serious harm resulted that could be attributed to the product), and since
the FDA has very limited resources, and cannot be everywhere at once, the
probability that the Company or the CEO would have faced sanctions was very
small. Let the probability that a company or individual faces any sanctions
whatsoever be q, and q is much smaller than 1. Let (EH equal the Expected
Harm caused by the company's rodent infestation.23 Let S equal the total p.7
sanction that the company or individual receives if it or he receives a sanction.
To achieve optimality, we want the expected sanction to be equivalent to the
21See 18 U.S.C. x3551 (CB 1164-65)
22421 U.S. 658 (1975)(CB 1155).
23Among the harms to society, some are: 1) any illnesses caused by the ingestion of adulter-
ated food; 2) loss caused by suboptimal purchasing (consumers would be buy less of a product
if they knew it were adulterated); and 3) by taking less care and allowing rodent infestation,
the company avoided the cost of keeping the warehouse free from rodents. The company was
therefore able to market its product at a lower price. This result reduced demand for competi-
tors' products and hurt competitors' economic viability. This harm caused by the company
unfairly gaining a larger portion of the market must be factored into the costs of defendant's
actions. By not taking care, the defendant's company achieved private gains that would not
be shared by society, namely swiping a larger share of the market than it deserved. This type
of private gain does not add to social wealth, it merely redistributes it. We want the company
to engage in activity when the benet to society caused by its actions outweighs the costs to
society, not when the benet to M caused by its actions outweighs the costs to society. Any
perverse
7expected harm. Therefore, we want: q.S = (El-I. As a result, when Mr. Park re-
ceived a sanction for his violations, the sanction, 5, should have been (EH/ q.24
Considering the small likelihood that a company or an individual is sanctioned,
if companies believe that they will only face, if prosecuted, a ne totalling $250,
their Expected Liability is minimal and their incentives to take care cannot be
preserved.
Others have echoed this view. Director Campbell of the FDA has
stated exactly what the Park case shows: that the pure food laws provide for
such mild penalties that a manufacturer could pay the nes imposed... and
continue to do wrong.25 Two authors, Arthur Kallet & F.J. Schlink, have
argued that since litihe nes actually assessed are too small and since it is the
publicity lithe companies] fear, the FDA should issue information to the public
about which companies are violating the act.26 Since negative publicity could
destroy a company, even though the probability of receiving this sanction would
be small, the Expected Liability would still be high. Furthermore, the cost of
publicity to the FDA might be suciently small and yet have such a strong
deterrent eect on companies that this sanction might be very eective. The
problem with this sanction is that the eect of publicity might be dicult to
gage. It would be very hard for the FDA to control the private gain that the
24Notice that since q is always less than 1, the sanction imposed on the defendant should
always be higher than the expected harm caused. Moreover, the smaller the probability of
liability is, the greater the sanction needs to be. For example, assume the probability that
any one company actually receives a sanction for infestation is.01. (This may not be an
unrealistically low gure considering how wide-spread infestation is, as evidenced by FDA
tolerance levels). If the company causes $1,000 of harm to society, then the company should
receive a ne of $100,000, or 100 times the magnitude of the harm caused to society.
25Arthur Kallet & F.J. Schlink, 100.000.000 Guinea Pigs (1933)(CB 1194).
26Id.
8company achieved (such as stealing a greater portion of the market by not taking
care), which is not shared by society must be factored into the harm to society
to preserve proper incentives. Cf. Shavell, Principles of Economic Analysis of
Law x20.1.2. p. eect publicity has on a company. We don't want Coca-Cola to
be destroyed if one inspector nds one y near the processing machines. If the
FDA can't control the damage that publicity would cause, using such a device
might over-deter rms and encourage rms to take too much care.
Unfortunately, the other enforcement techniques also have major
problems. Under seizure, the worst that can happen is loss of the value of the
shipment, crate, or carton of conscated goods. Seizure is a sanction, therefore,
that is not tailored to equalling the expected harm caused by a company's
violation. Rather, it is a loss of the production costs of the seized product.
Furthermore, it is very expensive for the FDA to institute a seizure action, and
thus very draining on FDA's limited resources.27 Under recall, as opposed to
under seizure, the additional costs of actively recalling the products is imposed
on the producer, and recall causes negative publicity. It therefore imposes a
greater liability on the producer while avoiding the severe costs to the FDA.
Recall suers, however, from the same defect that seizure suers from, since
recall is not tailored to the harm caused.28 Restitution, though, has a number
of advantages over seizure.29 Under restitution, the company loses the market
27See infra part C. for a discussion on when seizure is ecient.
28See infra part D. for a broader discussion on recall.
29Courts have rejected the use of restitution as an enforcement device. See
U.S. v. Parkinsor' 240 F.2d918 (9th Cir. 1956)(CB 1175). The Parkinson court held that
the FDCA did not authorize such a remedy, and since no individuals were named as parties,
restitution would be inappropriate. However, I am solely concerned with whether restitution
would be an ecient remedy in certain cases.
9price for the product rather than merely the production cost. Furthermore,
producers are sanctioned for the amount of product consumed rather than solely
for the amount that the FDA was able to seize. However, restitution also has a
few drawbacks. It does not stop the tainted product from continuing to reach
the public. It also imposes a cost on the FDA to set up a system for disbursing
the recovery to consumers.30 Finally, restitution also fails to p. tailor liability to
expected harm. The last method of enforcement I will mention in this section,
the regulatory letter, has the advantage of being a very cheap way of warning
companies into compliance. However, the regulatory letter imposes no real
sanction on the company. A company committing minor violations, which are
of the type most likely to receive regulatory letters, has little incentive to correct
violations before receiving such a letter, since no harm is caused to the company
by being punished with this device.
Fortunately, [un early 1991, the [FDA] embarked on a highly pub-
licized policy of enhanced enforcement of the FDCA in an eort to restore 'the
credibility and the integrity' of the FDA. Eorts were focused on widely-known
companies and consumer products.31 Furthermore, the criminal provisions of
the Act have been relied upon more heavily in recent years.32 Moreover, in
the rst few months after the 1992 Generic Drug Enforcement Act, the FDA
won almost 40 convictions and $19,000,000 in criminal nes.33 It remains to
be seen whether this renewed eort will adequately increase expected sanctions
30Id. atCB 1176-77.
3131 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 629, 641.
32Id. at643.
33Id. at645.
10to combat eroded incentive structures. While this renewed eort can only be
praised, the FDA should take this opportunity to consider some of the above
concepts when determining what methods of enforcement are to be employed
and what magnitude of sanctions are to be brought.
Because the FDA is currently targeting widely-known companies,
a nal question is whether this selective enforcement is ecient. From a legal
standpoint, [ut is well established that [the FDA] has discretion to initiate en-
forcement action against fewer than all of the rms engaged in similar unlawful
conduct.34 From an eciency perspective, this system is not on such sure foot-
ing. Selective p.10 enforcement is not necessarily problematic. It is much less
costly for the FDA to be able to initiate proceedings against only a few violators.
While this reduces the probability that any one company will face sanctions,
as long as the FDA matches the reduction in the likelihood of sanctions with
a corresponding increase in the actual sanctions imposed, then the expected
sanctions a rm faces will remain the same, incentives will be preserved, and
FDA resources conserved. It also makes sense to go after widely-known compa-
nies because the publicity surrounding such actions will ensure that the limited
action will have the maximum impact.
There are problems, however, with the current system of selective
enforcement. If the FDA primarily goes after widely-known companies, the
probability that those widely-known companies will face prosecution will be
high, while the lesser-known companies will face only a very small probability
34CB1045.
11of facing liability. If drastic adjustments are not made to the actual sanctions
imposed, lesser-known companies will have little incentive to take care because
their expected sanction will be so low (as a result of the minimal probability of
facing sanction), while widely-known companies will be forced to take care. Not
only may this system encourage many violations from lesser-known companies,
but it may also put widely-known companies at a competitive disadvantage.35
Another problem with the current system of selective enforcement
is that the FDA has announced which categories of violations it will focus on.
Sam D. Fine, who had once served as FDA Associate Commissioner for Com-
pliance, explained that the FDA will focus prosecution eorts on a continuation
or repetition of violations over a period of time, or a single gross or deliberate
violation including p. agrant, life-threatening, or intentionally false or fraud-
ulent violations.36 While it certainly makes sense to focus limited resources on
the most dangerous and harmful violations, or the most culpable conduct, such
a system creates incentives to allow minor violations or to be willfully blind
to such minor violations. If prosecution, or sanctions, are so rare for minor
violations, then in order to preserve incentives, actual sanctions imposed for
minor violations need to be very high, and may in fact need to be higher than
35Such companies will be at a competitive disadvantage because they will have to expend
more resources to ensure compliance. Such expenditure will result in a higher priced product.
If we assume that consumer information is imperfect. (which is likely since imperfect consumer
information and the corresponding need to protect consumers are the principle justications
for the FDCA,) then consumers will see the higher price, but will not translate that price
into the greater safety or higher level of sanitation that the price represents. All consumers
will see is a higher price, and thus will consume the products of lesser-known companies at a
greater rate.
36Sam D. Fine, The Philosophy of Enforcement 31 F.D.C. L.J. 324 (1976)(CB 1149). See
also Government's Brief in U.S. v. Park 421 U.S. 658(1975), at pp. 30-32 (CB 1160, 1161).
12actual sanctions for major violations.37 Unless we are willing to tolerate minor
violations of the FDCA, something must be done to preserve the incentives to
avoid such violations.
B.Inspections
The statutory authority to inspect is explicitly given by x704, which
provides that inspectors can enter and inspect, at reasonable times and within
reasonable limits any factory, warehouse, or establishment in which food, drugs,
devices, or cosmetics are manufactured, processed, packed, or held, for introduc-
tion into interstate commerce or after such introduction,.., any vehicle, being
used to transport or hold such [itemsl in interstate commerce.38 Inspectors can
ask to see all pertinent equipment, nished and unnished materials, containers,
and p.12 labeling therein.39 And in the case of prescription drugs or restricted
devices, inspectors can also see all things theirin (including records, les, papers,
processes, controls, and facilities) bearing on whether such items are adulter-
ated or misbranded within the meaning of this Act,... or otherwise bearing on
violation of this Act.40 Furthermore, x301(f) of the FDCA prohibits [tihe re-
fusal to permit entry or inspection as authorized by x704. The FDA's ability
37For example, if the probability of receiving a ne for a minor misbranding violation that
causes$100 in societal harm is one in ten thousand, a defendant who does get sanctioned
should be ned$1,000,000. Such a ne will result in the defendant's expected sanction opti-
mally equalling the expected harm to society. But if the probability of receiving a ne for
a major infestation problem that causes $250,000 in societal harm is 0.50, then a defendant
who does get sanctioned for this oense should be ned $500,000. Although these nes would
be appropriate in order to preserve incentives, the likelihood that society would accept such
a counter-intuitive system seems dubious. One possible way to institute this low probabil-
ity/high sanction system is to allow insurance against such nes. For an explanation of how
insurance could make this system work, see the discussion below on why recall insurance would
be ecient, infra part E.
38x301(a)(1).
39Id.
40Id.
13to inspect all factories, warehouses, or other facilities falling under the jurisdic-
tion of the FDA is crucial to successful enforcement of the FDCA. In 1952, the
Supreme Court noted that it is from factory inspections that about 80 percent
of the violations [of the FDCA] are discovered, [and also stated] that the small
force of inspectors makes factory inspections, rather than random sampling of
nished goods, the only eective method of enforcing the [FDCA].41 Courts
have held, however, that an inspection pursuant to a [x704] notice to inspect is
authorized only when there is a valid consent. If consent is withheld, a separate
violation of the Act occurs and the FDA inspectors are required to obtain a[n
administrative] warrant before the inspection can proceed.42 The rationale for
this holding is that because the FDCA punishes refusals to permit inspections
by imprisonment up to one year, or a ne of not more than $1,000, or both,
consent must be obtained.43
This system, which forces inspectors to get consent or a warrant, is
problematic. It would be inecient for FDA inspectors to get a warrant before
every attempt at inspection. The required FDA manpower would be great and
would result in substantial costs; FDA inspectors have plenty of better things
to do than waste time getting warrants every time they want to do a routine
inspection. There are also p.13 substantial costs in providing an administrative
probable cause hearing for every inspection request. Furthermore, few compa-
nies or individuals would be willing to refuse consent if asked: 1) it is a crime
41United States v. Cardi 344 U.S. 1952 (1952)(CB p.liO2).
42United States v. lamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals. Inc. 651 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.
1981)(CB p.1104, 1106). See also U.S. v. I.D. Russell Laboratories 439 F. Supp. 711 (W.D.
Mo. 1977).
43Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals 03 at 1106.
14to refuse to allow the FDA to inspect; 2) since the FDA would easily be able
to obtain a warrant, the company or individual would rarely gain anything by
refusing consent; and 3) in most cases, the easiest way of dealing with the FDA
is to be reasonable, not look like you're trying to hide something, and keep the
FDA inspector happy. In sum, if there are any benets gained by having the
warrant in the rare case where it would be necessary, such benets would be far
outweighed by the costs of getting one in every situation.
It is also inecient for an inspector to go to an establishment and
hope that the owner, operator, or custodian will not refuse consent.44 Such
a system reduces incentives to take care. If I am the owner of a food storage
facility, I know that if an FDA inspector comes and requests to inspect my
facility, I can refuse consent. If I exercise this choice I will: 1) be subject to
a maximum of 1 year imprisonment, a ne of up to $1,000, or both; and 2)
force the inspector to get an administrative warrant. My cost of refusal is the
expected ne or prison sentence. My benet is what I can do with the time it
takes for the inspector to procure a warrant. I can clean the factory, burn or
otherwise destroy foodstu that is clearly in violation of the FDCA, or try to
cure violations. If by forcing the inspector to get I warrant I can eliminate or
hide enough violations, then it might be worthwhile for me to refuse consent.
Let W be the average amount of time it takes to get a warrant. Let the Expected
Punishment45 I will personally receive if I consent to the inspection be (EP1.46
44[Clonsent must be given by the 'owner, operator, or custodian' and not by a subordinate
employee. U.S. v. Maryland Baking Co. 81 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Ga. 1948)(CB 1110, n.3).
45See supra, note 12.
46See supra, note 16. So if P1 is the actual punishment I would receive had I consented
to inspection, been charged with violations, convicted, and sentenced, (EI'1 is the Expected
15Let (EP2 be the Expected Punishment I will personally receive if I refuse p.14
consent, violate x301(f), and use the time W to eliminate or hide violations.
Assume that 1 will not be reducing the probability that I am convicted, (in
fact, by refusing to consent, which is a clear violation, I am only increasing the
probability of conviction). It is possible that I may reduce the actual punishment
enough that my expected punishment will decrease, despite any increases caused
by my refusal to give consent. If (EP2 < (EPI then it will be ecient, from my
point of view, to refuse consent. Because I know in advance of any inspection
that I can refuse consent, I may have a decreased incentive to eliminate certain
quickly remedied or easily hidden FDCA violations. In those situations, I will
only face the lesser (EP2, instead of the more severe (EPi.
The only possible justications for allowing a rm to refuse consent
seem weak. The statute already requires that an inspection must be at reason-
able times and within reasonable limits so that inconvenience is minimized.47
Also, if an inspector is using inspection to harass, refusing consent only exposes
oneself to criminal sanction. Since the FDA inspector can always get a warrant
to do a routine inspection if consent is refused, the only possible justication for
a rm to refuse consent is to try to hide violations. The consent requirements
should therefore be eliminated. As long as the FDA inspector provides notice
and complies with the other statutory requirements, consent should be sought
(to keep things civil), but not required.
C.Seizures
Punishment I would receive. CEI'1, as explained in supra, note 12, is found by multiplying
the probability that I am convicted by the actual punishment I receive if I am convicted.
47Id.
16Section 304 of the FDCA grants the FDA the authority to seize
items that violate the Act. The FDA can initiate a suit seeking seizure and
condemnation of the item in question. Preliminary seizure can be authorized.48
The owner then has the p.15 opportunity to appear as a claimant and to have
a full hearing before the court.49 In the hearing, the government must prove its
case by a preponderance of the evidence.50
Seizures can be very useful. In an unfortunately large number of
instances, however, seizure is a wholly ineective and inappropriate remedy that
needs to be supplemented by more ecient approaches.51 Seizure can be very
expensive, represent[ing] a substantial expenditure of government resources.52
Yet, many seizures,..., include only a small amount of the total goods involved.53
Furthermore, for a ten year period up to 1973, 13 percent of [FDA] seizure
recommendations were never executed because the product had been moved or
consumed during the time taken to complete [seizure] procedures.54 Finally,
and perhaps most troubling, the impact of a single seizure of a small amount
of a product can be eectively blunted simply by ling a claim and engaging in
the usual pre-trial discovery. The inventory of the oending product can then
be relabeled, or exhausted without change, and at that point a consent decree
48Parke. Davis & Co.. v. Califano 564 F.2d 1200(6th Cir. 1977)(CB 1127, 1128). Some
Courts have held that seized product should not be returned to the claimant pending nal
determination. See U.S. v. Article of Device... 110 V Vapozone... 194 F. Supp. 332 (N.D.
Cal. 1961)(CB 1123, n.1).
49Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry. Inc. 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
50See. e.g. U.S. v. 60 28-Capsule Bottles... UnitroL 325 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1963)(CB 1130).
51Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under The Federal Food. Drug and
Cosmetic Act 28 F.D.C. L.J. 177 (1973)(CB 1136).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
17can be accepted or the claim withdrawn and the case forfeited.55
Since seizure is far from a perfect remedy, it would be useful to
determine when seizure would be ecient. The simple answer is that the costs
and benets of each alternative technique of enforcement should be weighed and
the option which maximizes social utility should be used. To develop a more
intricate model, I will p.16 use a hypothetical. Ms. A raises cattle. FDA inspec-
tor Mr. B does some routine preliminary tests on A's cattle. These tests seem
to indicate that 100 cows probably contain trace residues of illegal antibiotics.56
If such residues are proved to be present, the cows will be condemned. At this
point, B has two options: 1) B can go and get a warrant to seize the 100 cows;
or 2) he can talk with A, describe his ndings, explain that he does not want to
have to seek an injunction that would close down A's business or seek criminal
charges that could result in A receiving a prison term, and informally ask that
A separate these cows and make sure that they are not used for meat.57
In choosing between these options, B needs to determine what the
costs and benets of seizing the cows are. The rst cost is the actual expense E
of seizing the cows. As stated previously, seizures can be very expensive. There
are administrative costs including the time wasted obtaining the authority to
seize, using up court time, coming back, and seizing the product. And while
B, in this case, would not have to track down all of the adulterated product in
many states, and initiate seizures in each district, the seizure of 100 cows would
55 Id.
56Assume that these are preliminary eld tests and are not 100 percent accurate.
57While there are normally other options, assume that they are either less ecient or not
available.
18be expensive. Transportation costs, food costs, and storage costs (whatever that
means in terms of large livestock) would all be steep.
The second cost from seizure is any damage to the cows during the
seizure, and the conscation period caused by the FDA. Cows may be injured
from transportation, or may become sick, lose weight, or die as a result of the
FDA, rather than the owner, caring for the cows. Let (ED be the Expected
Damage done to the cows from seizure. To keep this problem simple, let us
assume that there is only one level of damage D, and a certain probability q that
if B seizes the cows, damage D will occur.58 Therefore, (lED = q.D. However,
this damage only aects society if the FDA p.17 would lose on their seizure
and condemnation suit. If the FDA wins, the cows would have to be destroyed
and any damage to the cows caused by the seizure is irrelevant. Only if A wins
and could use the cows would any damage to the cows matter. Therefore, let p
equal the probability that the FDA would lose its condemnation suit (and thus
i-p equals the probability that the FDA would win). The cost to society from
damage of seizing the cows is the probability that the FDA would lose multiplied
by the expected damage caused if B seizes the cows, or p.(ED  o p.q.D.
Finally, the last cost of seizure is the damage done to society if the
seizure fails because while B was getting authorization to seize, the cows were
moved or put into commerce.59 Let r be the probability that even if B attempts
58In reality, there may be many dierent levels of damage. There might be a 10 percent
chance of$100 of damage occurring, a 30 percent chance of $1000 of damage occurring, and
aS percent chance of$10,000 of damage occurring. In any one seizure, we can therefore expect
an average damage of 0.1~100 +0.31000 + 0.05.10,000 = 810. (ED would, in this case, equal
$810.
59Cf. supra note 23 and accompanying text.
19a seizure, A will be able to move or sell the cows and avoid seizure.60 Let H equal
the harm to society from illness or built up resistance to antibiotics, which will
occur if A can avoid seizure and the cows enter into the stream of commerce.61
Therefore, even if B tries to seize the cows, there is a probability r that H harm
to society will occur. Therefore, p.18 the Expected Harm to Society caused by
the failure obtain the seizure in time is (El-It = rH. However, harm to society
only occurs when the failure to seize due to delay aects the end result. If A
would have prevailed in the condemnation suit, then the cows could have been
put lawfully into the stream of commerce. Then, the fact the FDA failed to
seize the cows because of the delay in getting authorization would be irrelevant.
Had the cows been successfully seized, A would have won the condemnation
suit, and the cows would have reached the market anyway. Only when the FDA
would have won the condemnation suit, and could have prevented the harm to
society, but failed to do so because B unsuccessfully tried seizure instead of a
more expedient or more eective alternative, is harm caused by the attempted
seizure. Therefore, since we stated above that the probability that A would
not win the condemnation suit is l-p, it is only with that probability that the
Expected Harm was caused by the seizure. We can summarize this by saying
60While the option of administrative detention might be possible, which would lower the
probability that A could move or put the cows into commerce, all that would do is reduce r.
However, since the FDA currently does not have this power, and would have to rely on the
states, I will omit such a consideration. See CB 1137.
61Since [miany seizures, include only a small amount of the total goods involved, then the
harm prevented by keeping that small amount o the market might be small. Hutt, supra
note 49. Furthermore, it should be noted that society is harmed even when there is only
economic adulteration or mislabeling of products. Consumers misallocate funds (spend more
money than they would optimally spend on products that optimally they might not buy)
and legitimate businesses are hurt since the violator will capture a larger share of the market
than is optimal. This will 1) hurt other businesses' ability to succeed and invest in research
and development of socially benecial advances and 2) encourage other businesses to cheat in
order to compete.
20that the Harm to Society caused by attempting seizure is (1-p)~ ~'-1t = (1-
p).r.H. To conclude, the total cost of seizure can, therefore, be represented by:
E + p.(ED + (1-p)(EHt = E + p.q.D + (1-p)~r~H
We can similarly analyze the benets of seizure (or the costs of not
seizing). If B decides to trust A not to put the cows into stream of commerce,
then there is a probability s that A will cheat and get them on the market. If
the cows enter the market, harm H (the same H used above) will occur. Once
again, however, harm H is only caused by the B's decision not to seize if A
cheats and A would have lost the condemnation suit. As similarly explained in
the discussion on the Expected Harm to Society caused by the delay in obtaining
seizure, if A would have won the condemnation suit, then the cows could have
gone on the market anyway. Thus, any harm to society caused by A cheating
and breaking her promise would be caused regardless of that violation of B's
trust. Therefore, let the Expected Harm caused by B choosing not to seize and
A cheating equal (EHc which would equal H occurring with a probability of s.
And since this Expected Harm is only relevant or only factored into the cost to
society when A would not have won the condemnation suit, (or with probability
l-p,) this cost to society of not seizing is (1P)(EHc = (1 p).s.H.
The other cost of not seizing is any harms caused by tampering
with the evidence. If A retains control over the cows, it may be possible for
her to tamper with the cows, or somehow eliminate the presence of the residues
in the cows. Assuming that this is possible in some situations, tampering may
reduce the probability that the FDA is able to meet its burden of proof in the
21condemnation suit, i.e., tampering may reduce the probability that the FDA is
able to successfully bring criminal charges against A. Let t be the probability
that A is convicted of criminal charges if B seizes the cows. If B does not
seize the cows, and B thus gives A an opportunity to tamper, then let x be the
positive amount by which the probability that A is convicted is reduced (if B's
failure to seize the cows reduces, from 50 percent to 40 percent, the probability
that A is convicted, then x = 0.10).62
Assume that if convicted, A will in either situation receive Pun-
ishment P. Therefore, A's expected punishment under seizure is t~P, but A's
expected punishment if B doesn't seize is (t-x)~P. If FDA inspectors always
seize, A's Expected Punishment, or (EP1 = tP. A, therefore, will only violate
the FDCA if her Benet B from violating the act is greater than her expected
punishment, or B > t.P. Now assume that overall, inspectors seize with proba-
bility y and do not seize with probability 1-y (the probability, therefore, that
inspectors either seize or do not seize is y + 1-y = 1). Under this second regime,
A's Expected Punishment, ~~~'2' equals the weighted averages of the possible
outcomes, or:
(EP2 zzy.[t.P] + (1-y)[(t-x).P]
A successfully tampers with the cows are factored into the value of
x. The greater those probabilities are, the greater the value of x is.
Combining like terms: y.t.P + tP - y.t.P - (1-y)~x~P =
= t~P - (1-y).x.P
62For simplicity, the probability that A attempts to tamper with the cows and the proba-
bility that
22Since both (1-y) and x are dened as positive probabilities and,
thus, are both greater than zero:
= t~P - (1-y).x.P < tP Therefore, since t~P = (EP1:
From this result we can see that under a policy where seizure does
not occur every time, and where violators are given the opportunity to tamper,
violators will face a lower Expected Punishment. A will have an increased
incentive to violate the FDCA because under a 100 percent seizure regime the
Benet B, gained from violating the act, had to outweigh (EP1; now B must
only be greater than (EP2.63
Because a regime where seizure always occurs eliminates the oppor-
tunity to tamper, which preserves the higher incentives to take care, B's decision
whether to seize or not will have a marginal eect on incentives. A decrease in
the incentive structure will increase FDCA violations and cause more harm to
society. Let R be the cost to society which results in the marginal decrease in
incentives caused by B's decision not to seize.
Finally, the tampering itself will cause harm to society. We spend
an incredible amount of money on the judicial system to ensure that justice is
done. We are willing to pay, in the form of taxes, money to punish violators and
receive the satisfaction of seeing them brought to justice. Tampering, whether A
ultimately p.21 would have won or lost the condemnation suit, like corruption,
63Please note that in my above discussion on inspections, see infra part B., when the
expected punishment was lowered due to the time required to get a warrant, I only adjusted
the magnitude of the actual punishment while keeping constant the probability that I would be
convicted. Here, however, A's Expected Punishment is reduced because she is able to reduce
the probability that she will be convicted even if she cannot lower the actual punishment if
she is convicted. A more complex analysis might allow for both variables to be adjusted in
each situation.
23hurts the integrity of the system. Therefore, the Expected Tampering Harm, or
(FT. is the expected harm caused to society caused by A's tampering, which is
the product of the probability that A tampers and the actual harm T caused if
A tampers. Let u be the probability that A tampers. Thus (FT = u~T.
In sum, the cost of not seizing is:
(1p)~(2EHc + R + (ET= (1p).s.H + R + u~T
As expressed earlier, the cost of seizing is:
E + p.q.D + (1-p).r.H
Therefore, seizing is ecient if the cost of seizing is less than the
cost of not seizing, or if:
F + p.q.D + (1-p).r.H < (1-p).s.H + R + u~T.
Combining similar terms, seizure is ecient when:
E + p.qD + (r-s)~(1-p)H < R + u~T
D.Criminal Sanctions
A third enforcement mechanism left to the FDA is criminal sanc-
tions, which can be applied to either a company or an individual. This mech-
anism is a very powerful one since the FDCA dispenses with the conventional
requirement for criminal conduct{awareness of some wrongdoing. In the inter-
est of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person
otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger....64
While the Supreme Court has recognized that [hlardship there doubtless may
be under [this] statute, the Court found that in liblalancing relative hardships,
64U.S. v. Dotterweicl' 320 U.S. 277 (1943)(CB 1150, 1151).
24Congress has preferred to place it upon those who have at least the opportunity
of informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the protec-
tion of consumers before sharing in p. illicit commerce, rather than to throw
the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly helpless.65
There are two other aspects of the criminal sanction that are worth
noting. The rst is the guarantee exemption and the second is the causation
requirement. Under x303(c) of the FDCA, a person who introduces an illegal
article into commerce is II] exempt from liability if he has received the article
in good faith and obtained a written guaranty that it is not in violation of the
Act.66 Furthermore, since responsible corporate agents are held accountable
only for causing violations of the FDCA, the Supreme Court has held that the
FDCA permits the defendant, at trial, to raise a defense that he was powerless
to prevent or correct the violation.67 However, courts have dened powerless
very narrowly.68
There have been many eorts to relax the FDCA's strict criminal
liability standard.69 However, from an eciency perspective, the strict liabil-
ity standard, the guarantee exemption, and the causation requirement are all
excellent devices and should not be changed.
The FDCA's strict liability standard is appropriate. Consumers are
65Id. at 1152.
66CBI165.
67U.S. v. Park 421 U.S. 658 (1975)(CB 1155, 1158)(quoting
U.S. v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co. 376 U.S. 86,91 (1964)).
68In Park. 421 U.S. at CB 1155, 1156, the Court rejected defendant's powerlessness defense
despite the defendant's claim that after delegating responsibility for corrective action to a
division vice president, he did not 'believe there was anything Ihel could have done more
constructively than what Ihel found was being done.' Id. (changes in original)
69See Proposals to Change the Criminal Liability Standard 03 1163-64.
25unable to reduce the chance of adulteration, lth or harms caused by deleterious
substances. The people in responsible relation to the introduction of food and
drugs into commerce are best able to detect and eliminate FDCA violations.
They are the ones who are capable of preventing harms. If knowledge were
a requirement for establishing criminal liability, then incentives to uncover a
violation would be p.23 seriously jeopardized. Self-enforcement, which is essen-
tial considering the FDA's limited resources, would create knowledge, and thus,
expose an individual or rm to liability. Sell-enforcement, therefore, would dis-
appear, and the phrase ignorance is bliss would be literally true in the food and
drug industries. If, however, a CEO is exposed to possible criminal penalties
if his company is introducing adulterated products into the market, that CEO
is going to make sure that there are no violations. The strict liability standard
greatly increases the incentives to avoid violations. Even a negligence standard
would fail to preserve proper incentives. Under a negligence regime, the FDA
would have to prove some level of fault. In many circumstances, this burden
may be dicult meet. Therefore, strict liability is better. [T]he public interest
in the purity of its food [and drugs] is so great as to warrant the imposition of
the highest standard of care.70
Furthermore, since it would be cheaper and easier for rms to de-
termine the appropriate level of care than for courts to do so, strict liability
is the best regime. Under a strict liability regime, courts do not have to de-
termine due care levels. They can avoid this dicult task because rms are
70Park 421 U.S. at CB 1155, 1157.
26liable whether or not they had failed to take due care. Firms, however, will still
determine optimal care levels under strict liability; they are required to pay for
either the costs of taking care or the costs of not taking care; they will thus
have the proper incentive to lower the total costs. Once again, strict liability is
the proper standard.
The guarantee exemption is also ecient. Some companies, like
the defendants in U.S. v. Balanced Foods, Inc.71 move thousands of goods into
interstate commerce, goods that are produced, packaged, and labelled by other
companies. If there were no guarantee exemption, then companies like the
defendants in Balanced Foods would have to inspect every item themselves,
submit samples of each product for testing, and expend enormous resources to
avoid criminal liability.
Because the producers are the ones who truly control whether the
products comply with the FDCA or violate it, and can ensure FDCA compliance
at the cheapest cost, the guarantee clause is ecient.
Once again, a hypothetical can easily demonstrate this principle.
Shipping company J transports all of producer K's medical devices. It costs J
$5 per device in shipping costs. If J could not get a guarantee to insulate itself
from criminal liability, it would have to invest $2 per device to insure compliance
with the FDCA.72 J would, therefore, charge K $7.25 per device to transport K's
products (the $0.25 represents economic prots). K makes the devices, however,
71146 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)(CB 1166).
72That $2 would represent the rm's optimal investment in FDCA violation compliance.
The rm would invest money in ensuring compliance until the cost of taking more care was
greater than the benet derived from such care (the benet comes from the reduction in the
expected criminal liability).
27and thus K would only have to spend $0.50 per device to achieve the same level
of FDCA compliance that J achieved by spending $2 per device. Furthermore,
K already has to invest that $0.50 to protect itself from criminal liability.73 This
duplicative eort is a complete waste of resources. Over-investment in compli-
ance is just as inecient as under-investment in compliance.74 Furthermore,
if J could get a guarantee which would protect it from liability, then it could
charge $5.75 for shipping K's products. J would be better o because it would
make an extra $0.50 per device in prots, and K would be better o because
it would be paying J $1.50 less per device in shipping costs without any addi-
tional costs of its own.75 Furthermore, since these costs are always p.25 passed
on to the consumer, in a regime with the guarantee exemption, the consumers
would pay less for K's products. The guarantee clause avoids duplicative eort
and creates a system where the cheapest complier takes sole responsibility for
compliance. This result is optimal because it ensures the same, if not greater,
level of compliance at a lower cost to everyone.76
Finally, the causation requirement and the strict interpretation of
73In reality, because K can ensure compliance at a lower cost, K would probably spend more
than $0.50 to ensure compliance and achieve a higher level of compliance than K would. As
J did, K would invest in ensuring compliance until the cost of taking more care was greater
than the benet derived from such care. Dierent cost curves cause this dierence in optimal
levels of compliance.
74See supra note 19. It would be foolish for J to spend $10,000,000 and K to spend
$5,000,000 in eorts to comply with the FDCA when, alternatively, J and K can reach the
same level of compliance if K spends $5,000,000 and J spends $100 to arrange for K to guar-
antee K's product. If J does not or can not get the guarantee, then $9,999,900 has been
wasted.
75While realistically, there may be some transaction costs in drafting and obtaining a guar-
antee, once there was a standardized guarantee form, transaction costs should be negligible.
76A greater level of compliance is possible because if K does not have to pay J the extra
$1.50, then transportation costs would be reduced, and there would be more money available
for compliance eorts. Since K would not be diverting funds towards a duplicative eort, it
can aord to spend more on compliance.
28impossibility is ecient. If an individual truly did not cause the violation, had
no ability to cure the violation, and was not responsible in any way for its
introduction into commerce, then it is inecient to punish that person. No
deterrence can be achieved. Nothing can encourage people or rms to throw
money away by trying to prevent violations they truly cannot prevent. Fur-
thermore, the FDA will be wasting limited enforcement resources going after
such individuals. Because the FDA's resources are so scarce, FDA should use
its resources in a way which maximizes deterrence goals.
This argument, however, does not support a broad powerless de-
fense. In U.S. v. Certied Grocers Co-Op77 the defendant asserted an impos-
sibility defense. The prosecution even stipulated that the defendant was doing
everything possible to maintain sanitary conditions in the warehouse in question.
The court refused to accept the defense, rightly reasoning that the defendant
could have discontinued using the warehouse until the problem of rodent infes-
tation had been solved. If courts did not hold defendants liable every time the
defendants believed that they were doing everything possible, incentives would
not be preserved. The threat of imprisonment is an incredible incentive to go
that extra bit further, to nd that impossible solution, or to simply close down
a factory and accept a huge monetary p.26 loss until a solution can be found.78
4.Recall
771968-1974 FDLI Jud. Rec. 299 (W.D. Wis. 1974)
78I can't help thinking of a pop-culture analogy to illustrate this principle. I apologize
in advance. In the movie Under Siege the head terrorist was played by Tommy Lee Jones.
Tommy Lee Jones's computer systems expert was unable to regain control of a system. When
this expert stated that regaining control was impossible, Tommy Lee Jones put a gun to the
system expert's head. He then suggested that the punishment for failure was death. The
systems expert remarkably found a way to do the impossible. Of course, all of the systems
expert's eorts were wasted, because Steven Siegal. the hero, killed them ail in the end.
29Although there is some disagreement among dierent courts, and
even among dierent Judges within the same court, courts have generally have
held that the FDA is powerless to request a judicially-enforced recall.79 This
result is problematic: [blecause FDA cannot enforce recalls, they are a matter
of negotiation between industry and FDA and can be delayed or ineectively
carried out by the companies involved.80 The General Accounting Oce (GAO)
found, by examining 106 recalls, that an average of 15 days passed before the
rm acted on FDA's request for recall, 23 percent of the requests required 25
days for the companies to initiate recall.81 Furthermore, the GAO found that
in those 23 percent of the cases, 38 percent of the product was sold during the
delay.82 In one case, the rm took 55 days to initiate the recall, during which
period, about 75,000 defective tablets were sold.83 This situation is ridiculous.
The court in C.E.B. Products listed a number of reasons for its
holding, including:
1)the FDCA doesn't provide for such authority;84 2) the threefold
enforcement scheme of injunctions, seizure, and criminal prosecutions.... pro-
vides adequate before and after the fact remedies;85 3) recall would render the
79See United States v. C.E.B. Products. Inc. 380 F. Supp. 664 (ND. II. 1974)(CB 1178);
see also U.S. v. X-Otag Plus Tablets 441 F. Supp. 105 (D.Colo. 1977)(CB 1182. n.1), ~fLd
602 F.2d 1387(10th Cir. 1979). But see U.S. v. K-N Enterprises. Inc. 461 F. Supp. 988 (ND.
II. 1978)(CB 1181).
80GAO, Lack of Authority Limits Consumer Protection: Problems In Identifying and
Removing From the Market Products Which Violate the Law Rpt. No. B-16 4031(2) (1972)
(CB 1187).
81Id. at 1188.
82Id.
83Id.
84C.E.B. Products CD at 1180-81.
85Id. at 1180. See also U.S. v. Superpharm Corp., 530 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)(CB
1183, n.1).
30[defendant] company insolvent and necessitate bankruptcy proceedings;86 and 4)
[tjhe injuries suered by consumers, upon which proof was presented onails split-
ting and falling o, redness, soreness, nail disgurement, and infection oalbeit
serious and uncomfortable, are [in most cases treatable, and thus are] not of
that severity and proportion to warrant the extraordinary remedy sought by
the Government.87
From a law and economics perspective, C.E.B. Products is an awful
decision. Because courts refuse to order recalls at the FDA's request, one of
these days, a real emergency is going to require a judicially-ordered recall, but
the FDA will not pursue that avenue because they will not want to waste their
limited resources on hopeless requests oand the same scenario that resulted in the
L-tryptophan tragedy will happen all over again. Each one of the court's reasons
in C.E.B. Products for denying the power to request a judicially-enforced recall
is misguided. First, whether the literal language of the FDCA permits recall is
irrelevant. The only consideration is whether society is better o having recall
or not having recall, or stated another way, whether the benets to having recall
outweigh the costs. If the language of a statute requires an inecient result,
the law should be changed either by Judges (through judicial fudging of the
language of the statute)88 or by Congress (through amendments). Realistically,
there may be harms caused by judicial activism or administrative costs caused
by the bureaucratic red tape required to amend a statute. And while such costs
86C.E.B. Products CB at 1180-81.
87Id. at 1181.
88See U.S. v. K-N Enterprises CB at 1181.
31might outweigh the benets gained by permitting the ecient result,89 such
considerations are the subject of another paper. For purposes of this paper, if
we are better o having recall in the long run as a judicially-enforceable remedy,
then we should have it.
Second, the fact that the FDA's powers of injunction, seizure, and
criminal prosecutions are adequate is not a justication for not allowing a
judicially-enforced recall. The only relevant consideration is whether society
is better o having court-ordered recalls or not having them. While the other
options may be adequate, recall in certain circumstances is better than adequate.
Product recall has evolved over the years as the most expeditious and eective
method of removing violative products from the marketplace, particularly those
that present a danger to health.90
If the court's real concern is that the FDA would be too power-
ful, that recall is so potentially devastating that the FDA cannot use it eec-
tively, then that at least would be looking at an appropriate concern. However,
since voluntary recall is common, it seems clear that the FDA can handle the
power. More importantly, the court must order the recall; therefore, the court
can review the FDA's request to prevent abuses of discretion. Finally, x705
of the FDCA expressly authorizes the issuance of information to the public.91
89If the lack of recall authority costs this society $100,000 per year (the benets to having
such a power would outweighs the costs by this amount), but the administrative costs involved
in amending the statute was $10,000,000, then the cost to society in changing the system would
be greater than the net present value of the benet gained by changing the system. It would,
therefore, be inecient to change the system, and thus, mandatory recall would not be worth
the cost of getting it.
90Enforcement Policy. Practices and Procedures: Recall Policy and Procedures 41 Fed.Reg.
26924 (June30, 1976).
91Arthur Kallet & F.J. Schlink, 100.000.000 Guinea Pigs (1933)(CB 1194, 1195).
32This dreaded power of publicity is the real punishment92 which could destroy
a company a lot more eectively, and a lot more inexpensively than getting a
court-ordered recall. If we were really that concerned about FDA abuses of dis-
cretion, then an issuance of publicity would have to be reviewed by the court. If
court-ordered recall is the most eective remedy in p.29 certain instances, then
the fact that there are other, less-ecient, but adequate, substitute remedies is
not a valid reason for withholding this enforcement device.
Third, the argument that recall could bankrupt a company facing
such a contingency is not a justication for denying such authority. The com-
pany in question should have thought of that contingency before it allowed a
dangerous substance on the market. If a company chose to take the risk of
putting such a product on the market, it should bear the loss of such a decision.
Otherwise, companies will have the incentive to take dangerous risks because
courts are unwilling to bankrupt them; therefore, the companies will not have
to factor those costs into their decisions and will not behave optimally.
Moreover, if mandatory recall became common, recall insurance
could become available. There would be many advantages to such insurance.
Ideally, insurance companies set premiums at the Expected Cost, or (EC of
insuring each of its clients. Let q be the probability that Insurance Company I
will have to pay a claim for its insured X.93 Let C be the actual cost of paying
the claim if there is a claim. Therefore, the optimal premium P for I's coverage
of X would equal the probability of a claim multiplied by the cost of paying the
92Id. at 1194.
93The claim in this case is one for reimbursement of expenses incurred in X having to recall
a product
33claim, or: P = (EC = q.C.
Now let's look specically at recall insurance. The benet of each
insured paying P rather than a q chance of paying C is twofold: 1) risk is spread
among many parties; and 2) the assets required for each company to optimally
internalize costs will be reduced. A hypothetical will demonstrate these two
principles. Assume that there are 100,000 companies, each with one product
that falls within the FDA's jurisdiction. Now assume that each year there are 10
recalls. Also assume that insurance companies would not be able to determine
which types of companies were more at risk from recall.94 Assume that if a
recall is ordered, it will cost p.30
$10,000,000. The probability that company X will have to recall it's
product in any one year is 10 in 100,000 or 0.01 percent, so q =.0001. Therefore,
since P (EC = q.C, P = 0.0001$10,000,000 = $1,000. If manufacturers are
risk averse, then by denition, they would prefer to pay the $1,000 and avoid
the possibility of a devastating $10,000,000 loss. Recall insurance, like tort
insurance, or disaster insurance, would spread great risks over a large group
of people. Spreading risk makes risk averse parties better o, therefore, it is
socially advantageous.95 Furthermore, there would be little dissolution of risks.
Insurance companies could monitor care and preserve incentives by adjusting
the premiums for higher risk insureds, denying coverage in certain instances, or
94In an actual insurance system, I would develop actuarial tables and would more accurately
set risk levels, i.e., the probability of paying a claim q (for example, a person who has been in
ve car accidents in the last year would almost certainly pay a higher auto insurance premium
than someone who has never been in an accident in 25 years of driving; similarly, people who
live in a New York City pay a higher premium for auto theft insurance than people in areas
where motor vehicle theft is rare).
95See Shavell, Principles of Economic Analysis of Law x17.1. In the case of recall, since recall
is a fairly rare occurrence, premiums for recall insurance should be relatively reasonable.
34employing the use of deductibles.96 If insurance greatly decreased incentives to
take care, then many accidents, or in this case, recalls, would occur. If a great
number of recalls would occur, then the expected costs that insurance companies
would have to pay to insure the rms would greatly increase. The insurers
would have to increase premiums so much that it would not be worthwhile for
insurance to continue. [Plolicies that would substantially increase risks would
be so expensive that they would not be attractive for purchase.97
Additionally, an argument can be made that incentives to take care
under an insurance regime will be greater than in a regime without insurance.
Without insurance, if a company would be bankrupted by a recall, the com-
pany's total assets would be less than the cost of a recall. Since that company
can at most spend its total assets,98 it only has to factor its total assets into its
decisions to take care, and does p.31 not have to factor in the true cost of recall.
This is because the true cost of recall is more than it would or could ever have
to pay. Going back to the hypothetical where q =.0001 and C = $10,000,000,
assume X only has $1,000,000 in assets. If X had an insurance policy covering
recall, and the policy accurately reected risk, the premium would always be set
to reect the Expected Cost of Recall, or (EC = $1,000. Because the rm has
$1,000,000, it could aord the premium. Under an insurance regime, therefore,
an insured is only paying for expected recall costs, and thus, the insured is in-
ternalizing the entire cost of recall. In a non-insurance regime, if a recall would
96See Shavell, Principles of Economic Analysis of Law x17.
97Shavell, Principles of Economic Analysis of Law x17.4.4.
98Assume that because of its poor nancial situation, the company could not borrow addi-
tional funds. If it could borrow additional funds to cover the cost of recall, the recall would
not bankrupt the company.
35cost $10,000,000, the rm could at most be forced to pay $1,000,000. If a rm
were forced to recall, then q would stay at.0001 but C,~ would be $1,000,000
which is the total cost X would pay for recall (their total level of assets). There-
fore, the Expected Cost of Recall for X would only equal q.Cx = $100, when
it should truly be $1,000. Therefore, when choosing care levels to avoid recalls,
under a system without insurance, a rm with limited assets would not fully
internalize all the costs involved, but would only internalize the costs it could
bear.99 An insurance regime, in which premiums are set at the expected cost
to society, would better preserve incentives to take care when companies could
not aord to bear the full cost of a recall.
The nal justication of the court in C.E.B. Products was that
recall was not warranted since the harm caused by the product was not se-
vere. While weighmg the harm caused by the product, or better yet, the
harm prevented by the recall is a crucial determinant in whether a recall is
ecient, it is not the only consideration. The court should have determined
whether the cost of a recall was cheaper than the harm avoided. For example,
in U.S. v. K-N Enterprises~ Inc.100 the court properly ordered recall after nd-
ing that [t]he damage possibly sustained by the defendants p.32 because of an
improper recall is outweighed by th[eI threatened harm and by the undisputed
violation[s of the FDCA].101
A recall is ecient when the benets to recall outweigh the costs,
99For a further discussion, see Shavell, Principles of Economic Analysis of Law x15.8.
100461 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. II. 1978)(CB 1181)
101Id. at 1182.
36i.e., when the harm avoided by a recall outweighs the costs involved in recall-
ing the product. Assuming the FDA, in its discretion, could use mandatory
recall eciently, this power should be granted. As the GAO stated, in certain
instances, recall is the most expeditious and eective method of protecting the
public. Therefore, in these instances, recall avoids more harm to society than it
costs.
If manufacturers were held to a perfect strict liability standard,
where they were required to pay for all the harms to society, then they would
always act in a socially optimal manner.102 In this regime, a rm would want
to recall the products whenever it would be socially ecient to do so because it
would be cheaper than paying for all the injuries or damage to society. Let S be
the cost to society if recall were not used in this situation. Let F be the cost the
rm would face if recall were not used. Let R be the cost of a recall. If a recall is
socially ecient then S > R. But if a rm refused to order a recall when a recall
were socially ecient,103 then the costs to the rm of recalling would be greater
than the cost of not recalling, or R> F. Therefore, S > R> F. This demonstration
proves that any time a rm refuses to order an socially ecient recall, the cost
the rm would pay if it did not order the recall is less than the cost that society
would pay if the rm did not order recall. The rm, by denition, would not be
internalizing all costs to society caused by its action.104 Whatever the reason
for this failure, the rm's costs fail to adequately reect all the costs to society,
102See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
103I am assuming there is no uncertainty as to whether a recall is ecient.
104See infra part A.
37and therefore, the rm is not acting in a socially optimal manner. Firms should
not be allowed to refuse to institute a socially ecient recall. Rather, the FDA
should be given the power to request a judicially p.33 enforced recall.
Conclusion
Many of the types of issues and considerations discussed in this
paper can be applied to other areas within the eld of Food and Drug Law.
For example, the entire regulatory scheme for drugs needs to be analyzed. Is
pre-market approval of all new drugs cost ecient? Are incentives to discover
or create new drugs destroyed under the current regime? Should patients with
terminal illnesses be allowed to use new, unapproved drugs? In what circum-
stances? In the eld of cosmetics, should there be more stringent regulatory
requirements? Or would the costs to new regulation outweigh any benets?
These are only a sample of the many areas in which Law & Economics will be
useful. And while I may not have left the reader with many answers, hopefully,
I have left him or her with many questions, and a framework for thinking about
those questions.
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